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PARTIES INVOLVED 
DEBTOR, FAMILY, BUSINESS PARTNERS AND COUNSEL 
William E. Lindsey – Debtor, local businessman who focuses mainly in commercial real estate 
development and management. 
June Lindsey – Debtor’s second and current wife and beneficiary of certain suspect transfers 
following FirstBank’s motion for summary judgment. 
Ronald Nease—Leasing property from Lindsey 
Scott Davis—June Lindsey’s son from previous marriage, owns the Cocke County Briarthicket 
Road property 
Danika Lindsey – Debtor’s biological daughter and beneficiary of certain suspect transfers 
following FirstBank’s motion for summary judgment 
Cissy Hurst – Debtor’s adopted daughter and business partner is certain real estate transaction 
Matt Caldwell – Debtor’s long-standing business partner, and the party that FirstBank claims 
Lindsey is attempting to protect to the detriment of the estate 
Mike Fitzpatrick – Debtor’s attorney 
Tommy Daugherty – Debtor’s accountant 
Steven Whitley – Debtor’s business partner in Jefferson Plaza, LLC 
ENTITIES 
WIN, Inc. – Debtor owns 1,000 shares.  
Jefferson Plaza, LLC – At the time of filing the Debtor owned 50%.  Property located at X 
(google maps link) 
Eastland Capital, LLC – At the time of filing the Debtor owned 100%.  FirstBank suit led to 
bankruptcy 
Knoxville HMA Holdings, LLC – Company that bought substantially all of Mercy Health 
Systems’ assets 
Issus, Inc—Lindsey is sole shareholder, owned the Cocke County Bapist Hospital porperty 
Lindsey Leasing, LLC – Coal mining equipment leasing company 
JS&A, LLC – Mr. Lindsey held a 50% interest valued at $1.00 
Ultimate Toys Motorsports, Inc. – Motorcycle business 
3 
WL & MC Development, LLC – Had a construction loan and line of credit with SunTrust Bank 
BTRG, LLC – Mr. Lindsey owned a 30% interest with an estimated value of $1.00 
Ultimate Toys, LLC – Owns the motorcycle business building, leases back to UTM, Inc. 
LEC Properties – Mr. Lindsey owned a 30% interest with an estimated value of $90,000 
LHC Properties – Mr. Lindsey owned a 30% interest with an estimated value of $100,000 
Old Capital Town, LLC – Entity Debtor transferred to wife prior to summary judgment  
Flower’s Baking Company of Morristown, Inc. – Rented the Clinton Highway Property 
Minor entities include WL/MC, LLC, LECH, LLC, O.C. Energy, and additional entities 
transferred to wife and daughter. 
CREDITORS 
FirstBank, Walt Winchester 
Greeneville Federal, Mary Miller, Ralph Boswell (SeniorV.P.) 
Commercial Bank of Knoxville, Greg Logue 
Lincoln National, Austin McMullin 
Pinnacle Financial Partners, Tom Dickenson 
Mountain National Bank, Tom Dickenson 
Albert Haynesworth, Lynn Tarpey 
Regions Bank 
SunTrust 
COURT AND ADMINISTRATORS 
Becky Halsey – Bankruptcy Analyst with the U.S. Trustee’s office. 
Judge Richard Stair 
U.S. Trustee – Patricia Foster 
Chapter 11 Trustee – C. McRae Sharpe 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Although Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings are overwhelmingly focused on the 
reorganization of a business entity, due to threshold amounts located within the bankruptcy code 
(the “Code”), certain individuals must file within Chapter 11 to reorganize.1  The typical
individual bankruptcy is administered under Chapter 13, and offers its own set of unique 
features.  Courts across the country have struggled to determine whether an individual Chapter 
11 reorganization should be administered in a fashion more similar to the Chapter 13 personal 
reorganization or if the individual should be thought of as business to mirror the more common 
business reorganization within Chapter 11.
2
  In re Lindsey, the personal Chapter 11 of William E.
Lindsey deals with these intricacies and the difficulties associated with personal Chapter 11 
reorganizations.
3
1 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) 
2 See infra Chapter 7 (discussing the issues facing individual chapter 11 debtors relevant to this case). 
3 Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
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CHAPTER 2: INTRODUCTION OF WILLIAM LINDSEY 
William E. Lindsey (the “Debtor” or “Mr. Lindsey”) is a Knoxville businessman whose 
primary focus is leasing commercial real estate throughout East Tennessee.
4
  His personal
experience in real estate development and management stretch all the way back to his high 
school days in Maryville, TN.
5
  After attending the University of Tennessee for both his
bachelor’s degree and his MBA, Mr. Lindsey held numerous positions in corporate real estate 
working for local Wendy’s franchises and the Winn-Dixie supermarket chain among others.6
Mr. Lindsey is currently married to his wife June Dennis Lindsey, and has been since 1992.
7
This is Mr. Lindsey’s third marriage.8 He has one adopted daughter Cissy Hurst, and one
biological daughter, Danika Lindsey, from his first marriage.
9
   In the September of 2008, Mr.
Lindsey was diagnosed with terminal cancer; he is currently actively fighting the disease with 
radiation and chemotherapy.
10
  His prognosis has been a concern in his business practices, and
has led to some pre-filing transactions that were heavily disputed.
11
In 1989, Mr. Lindsey left the corporate world and began purchasing and leasing 
operations as an individual and under various business entities throughout East Tennessee.
12
  He
also owns sizeable stakes in multiple business entities that own and operate several commercial 
properties and some of the businesses occupying such properties.
13
  In order to finance many of
these projects, Mr. Lindsey utilized his relationships with local lenders to gain both loans as well 
4 Disclosure Statement, In re Lindsey at 4, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Summary of Schedules, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. D. Tenn April 5, 2010);
Disclosure Statement, In re Lindsey at 4, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010)., See infra Chapter 3
(discussing the the individual schedules).
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as customers.
14
  As is customary for corporate development lending, Mr. Lindsey was required to 
personally guaranty the loans made to his business entities, which were created for the sole 
purpose of developing and leasing the individual commercial properties.
15
 In certain 
circumstances his relationships with local banks led to client relationships in which Mr. Lindsey 
would borrow the funds necessary to purchase and construct property for a business owner who 
did not qualify for the multi-million dollar loans necessary for land acquisition and the 
subsequent construction of the necessary buildings.  This was Mr. Lindsey’s primary operation 
as the sole shareholder of Eastland Capital, LLC and Lindsey Leasing, LLC.
16
  These two 
business opportunities proved to be the catalyst for his pending bankruptcy.
17
Judgment against Mr. Lindsey 
According to Mr. Lindsey, he was approached by an acquaintance at FirstBank about 
partnering with Advanced Polymer Recycling, Inc. (“APR”) on the construction of a polymer 
recycling facility in Knoxville, TN.
18
  Mr. Lindsey was able to work out a satisfactory loan with 
FirstBank as well as a commercial lease with APR.
19
  Unfortunately for Mr. Lindsey, APR was 
unable to meet its monthly rent obligations following the death of one of its founding partners 
and the waning global demand for polymer recycling.
20
  Because APR could not meet its 
obligations, the recycling facility failed to produce the cash flow necessary to service its debt.
21
Eastland Capital’s default upon the note entitled FirstBank to accelerate the payment schedule 
and make demands for full satisfaction of the note amount from Eastland Capital and Mr. 
14 Disclosure Statement, In re Lindsey at 5, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. D. Tenn April 5, 2010).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
7Lindsey personally based on his guaranty agreement.
22
  Because Mr. Lindsey was unable to pay
the remaining principal and accrued interest on the various notes due to FirstBank, it filed suit 
against Mr. Lindsey for breach of contract on his guaranties.
23
Suing upon guaranties is typically a fairly easy matter to dispose of because the cause of 
action is relatively straightforward and all of the proof is contained within several documents.  
Likewise, FirstBank’s motion for summary judgment was granted, which resulted in a judgment 
in excess of $4,000,000.00 against Mr. Lindsey personally.
24
 Immediately following the
summary judgment order being signed, FirstBank recorded its judgment lien against Mr. Lindsey 
in Knox County and eight surrounding counties, which ultimately led to Mr. Lindsey’s petition 
for Chapter 11 protection from his creditors.
25
22 Id.
23 Id. at 6.
24 Response and Objection to Disclosure Statement by FirstBank, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D.
D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
25 Disclosure Statement, In re Lindsey at 9, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. D. Tenn April 5, 2010).
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CHAPTER 3: BANKRUPTCY FILED 
On April 5, 2010, Mr. Lindsey, with the help of his attorney Michael H. Fitzpatrick (“Mr. 
Fitzpatrick”), filed his Chapter 11 petition in the Eastern District of Tennessee.26    Mr. Lindsey’s
petition showed total liabilities of between $10,000,001 and $50,000,000, while his total assets 
only amounted to $1,000,001 and $10,000,000.
27
  Along with his petition, Mr. Lindsey filed both
his statement of compliance with credit counseling and his certificate of credit counseling along 
with a list of his 20 Largest Unsecured Creditors.  However, his schedules were not filed until 
May 3, 2010 following a motion to extend time to file.
28
  On April 19, 2010, Mr. Lindsey filed
his application to employ Mr. Fitzpatrick as his attorney; Mr. Fitzpatrick, the managing partner 
at Jenkins & Jenkins Attorneys, PLLC, is regarded as one of the top debtor’s attorneys in 
Knoxville.
29
Creditors 
Shortly after Mr. Lindsey filed his petition, Notices of Appearance began to slowly 
trickle in, including: Thomas H. Dickenson (“Mr. Dickenson”)30 on behalf of Creditor Mountain
National Bank, Mary D. Miller (“Mrs. Miller”)31 on behalf of Greeneville Federal Bank, and
Austin L. McMullen (“Mr. McMullen”)32 on behalf of Lincoln National Life Insurance.
Additionally, on April 23, 2010, Becky Halsey (“Ms. Halsey”) on behalf of the U.S. Trustee 
26 Voluntary Petition, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. D. Tenn April 5, 2010).
27 Id.
28 Id.; Debtor’s Motion for Additional Time to File Documents, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn 
April 5, 2010); Summary of Schedules, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn April 5, 2010).
29 Application to Employ Counsel, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
$10,000 retainer statement of financial affairs.
30 Notice of Appearance, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn April 5, 2010).
31 Motion to be Admitted Pro Hoc, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn April 5, 2010).
32 Notice of Appearance and Request for Notice, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5,
2010).
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filed notice that no committee of unsecured creditors would be filed in Mr. Lindsey’s case.33
Interestingly enough, one of the most active participants in the litigation, Walter N. Winchester 
(“Mr. Winchester” or “Winchester”), counsel for FirstBank, does not officially enter the 
bankruptcy proceedings until he files his first Motion for 2004 examination following the filing 
of Mr. Lindsey’s schedules.34  However, Mr. Winchester played a major role in the suit filed by 
FirstBank, which precipitated Mr. Lindsey’s bankruptcy.  Shortly after Mr. Winchester’s motion, 
Bruce C. Bailey (“Mr. Bailey”) filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of Regions Bank, Mr. 
Lindsey’s largest unsecured creditor.  On October 6, 2010 Gregory C. Logue (“Mr. Logue”) filed 
a Notice of Appearance on behalf of Commercial Bank of Knoxville.
35
Schedules 
As previously mentioned, Mr. Lindsey filed his statement of financial affairs and 
schedules on May 3, 2010 following the agreed order to increase the time for filing.
36
  Mr. 
Lindsey’s Statement of Financial Affairs shows his yearly income from his rental properties in 
2008 and 2009 was $240,220 and $342,995 respectively.
37
  In addition, he had realized $108,074 
in income for 2010 at the time of his filing.
38
  The Statement of financial affairs also reflected the 
FirstBank judgment and the subsequent registration of said judgment in the surrounding 
counties.
39
  Mr. Lindsey also listed 13 businesses in which he was involved at the time of his
33 Notice of No Committee of Unsecured Creditors Will Be Appointed, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. 
D. Tenn April 5, 2010).
34 Motion by FirstBank for Order Requiring Debtor to Appear for Examination Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004, In 
re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010). 
35 Notice of Appearance, In re Lindsey at Page, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn April 5, 2010).
36 Summary of Schedules, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn April 5, 2010); Order, In re Lindsey at 
1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
37 Statement of Financial Affairs, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn April 5, 2010).
38 Id.
39 Id.
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petition, six of which were classified as “single asset real estate” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101.40
Mr. Lindsey’s Summary of Schedules indicated assets totaling $5,575,668.54 and liabilities of 
over $36,000,000.
41
  His Summary of Schedules indicated real property assets of $3,500,500.00
and personal property assets of $2,075,168.54.  Likewise, it broke down his liabilities into 
secured claims in the amount of $4,250,000.00 and unsecured nonpriority claims totaling 
$32,026,796.00.  Additionally, it indicated a monthly income of just below $10,000.00.   
Schedule A specifically lists six pieces of real property with various property interests 
associated therewith.  The two largest assets are a fee simple interest in a building and land worth 
$1,600,000.00 (encumbered by a $1,200,000.00 secured claim by Pinnacle Financial Partners) 
and a leasehold interest in a commercial building worth $1,500,000.00 (encumbered by a 
$900,000.00 secured claim by Lincoln National).
42
  Notably, Mr. Lindsey lists his entireties
interest in his and his wife’s personal residence as $500.00, although the home and land are 
worth over $1,000,000.00.  Additionally, Schedule B shows Mr. Lindsey’s joint checking 
accounts with his wife contain roughly $60,000.00.  Mr. Lindsey’s business interests in the 13 
entities were also broken out as follows: 
Business Entity Interest Debtor’s Estimated Value 
WIN, Inc. 1,000 shares $1,000.00 
Jefferson Plaza, LLC 50% $1.00
43
Eastland Capital, LLC 100% $1.00 
Lindsey Leasing, LLC 50% $1.00 
JS&A, LLC 50% $1.00 
40 Id.
41 Summary of Schedules, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn April 5, 2010).
42 Mr. Lindsey also listed an unscheduled property interest in Schedule A; Schedule A – Real Property, In re Lindsey 
at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010); Schedule D – Creditors Holding Secured Claims, In re 
Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010); see generally First Amended Disclosure
Statement, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
43 See infra Chapter 11 (discussing Mr. Lindsey’s sale of his interest in Jefferson Plaza, LLC).
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Ultimate Toys Motorsports, Inc. 39% $1.00 
BTRG, LLC 30% $1.00 
Ultimate Toys, LLC 42% $1.00 
LEC Properties 30% $90,000.00 
LHC Properties 30% $100,000.00 
Old Capitol Town, LLC
44
50% $650,000.00 
WL/MC, LLC 50% Unknown 
LECH 33.33% Unknown 
Mr. Lindsey also listed notes receivable from his wife ($560,000.00) and his daughter, Danika, 
($530,000.00).
45
 Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-103, Mr. Lindsey claimed his interests in
WIN, Inc.; Jefferson Plaza, LLC; Eastland Capital, LLC; Lindsey Leasing, LLC; JS&A, LLC; 
Ultimate Toys Motorsports, Inc.; BTRG, LLC; and Ultimate Toys, LLC as exempt because his 
schedules valued each interest below the $10,000.00 threshold.
46
  Mr. Lindsey’s valuation of
these assets will come under a great deal of scrutiny and lead to some fairly contentious litigation 
over the coming years. 
Mr. Lindsey’s schedules list five secured creditors, Commercial Bank of Knoxville, 
Greeneville Federal Bank, Lincoln National, Matt Caldwell, and Pinnacle Financial Partners.
47
The secured claims are broken down as follows: 
44 This interest (roughly 31% of all scheduled assets) was included on Mr. Lindsey’s schedule in error as this interest 
was transferred to June Lindsey as part of the disputed preferential transfers. Excluding this interest from the
schedules effectively reduces Mr. Lindsey’s scheduled assets to $1,425,168.54
45 These notes were acquired upon the transfer of various business interests belonging to the Debtor. At the time of 
filing the disclosure statements none of the notes were secured. Schedule B – Personal Property, In re Lindsey at 1, 
No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010); Disclosure Statement, In re Lindsey at 5, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. 
D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
46 Schedule C – Property Claimed as Exempt, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010); 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-103 (2012).
47 Schedule C – Property Claimed as Exempt, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010)
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Creditor Description Value Claim Amount 
Commercial Bank of Knoxville Undeveloped Lot $140,000 $400,000* 
Greeneville Federal Bank Commercial Building $250,000
48
$250,000 
Lincoln National Commercial Building $1,500,000 $900,000 
Matt Caldwell LEC and LHC Real 
Properties 
$90,000 $1,500,000* 
Pinnacle Financial Partners Building and Land $1,600,000 $1,200,000 
*under secured
Mr. Lindsey listed no creditors holding unsecured priority claims.
49
  However, the
majority of his liabilities were listed on Schedule F as unsecured nonpriority claims.  The more 
than $32,000,000 in claims were listed as follows: 
Creditor Description Claim Amount 
Regions Bank Personal Guaranties $12,000,000 
FirstBank Judgment $3,950,000 
Pinnacle Financial Partners Personal Guaranties $3,900,000 
Commercial Bank of Knoxville Personal Guaranties $3,875,000 
SunTrust Bank Personal Guaranty $2,500,000 
G.E. Commercial Credit Personal Guaranties $1,657,249 
Greeneville Federal Bank Personal Guaranty $1,540,000 
Mountain National Bank Personal Guaranties $1,385,000 
Blanchard Calhoun Personal Guaranty $800,000 
Fifth Third Bank Personal Guaranty $300,000 
Capital Mark Personal Guaranty $119,547 
48 The value of this collateral will later be disputed by Greeneville Federal Bank. 
49 Schedule E – Creditors Holding Unsecured Priority Claims, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D.D. Tenn. 
April 5, 2010).  
13 
Mr. Lindsey’s Schedule G listed only two unexpired leases, one lease to Mercy Health 
Partners in Cocke County
50
 and another three year lease to Lanrick Group, LLC.
51
50 No term is listed in the schedules, but the 85 year lease was gifted to Mercy Health Partners in order to receive
certain tax benefits for the Debtor. Schedule G – Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, In re Lindsey at 1, No.
10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
51 Schedule G – Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn.
April 5, 2010).
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CHAPTER 4: EARLY MOTIONS 
Motions to use cash collateral 
Certain properties Mr. Lindsey had financed, with Lincoln National and Pinnacle 
Financial Partners specifically, were secured by among other things the rents from the properties 
associated therewith.
52
  As these were the only two properties that were positively cash-flowing
at the time of Mr. Lindsey’s filing, he filed motions to use the banks’ cash collateral to continue 
operations during the pendency of his bankruptcy on May 6, 2010.
53
  Both Lincoln National and
Pinnacle Financial Partners were able to reach an agreement with Mr. Lindsey to allow him the 
use of their cash collateral in exchange for adequate protection payments and a continuing 
security interest in the post-petition receivables of their respective properties.
54
2004 Examinations 
During the pendency of the Debtor’s motions to use the banks’ cash collateral, Mr. 
Winchester filed a motion seeking a 2004 examination of Mr. Lindsey, pursuant to Federal Rules 
of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2004.
55
  The main purpose of this examination was for FirstBank
to clarify some ambiguity in Mr. Lindsey’s Schedules and to determine which property interests 
were transferred prior to the bankruptcy filing.
56
  Mr. Lindsey’s 2004 examination led to further
requests to examine June Lindsey, Danika Lindsey, and Matt Caldwell, in order to determine the 
52 Motion to Use Cash Collateral of Pinnacle National Bank, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 
5, 2010). Motion to Use Cash Collateral of Lincoln National Life Insurance, In re Lindsey, No 10-31694 (Bankr. E. 
D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
53 Motion to Use Cash Collateral of Pinnacle National Bank, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 
5, 2010). Motion to Use Cash Collateral of Lincoln National Life Insurance, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694
(Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
54 Agreed Order Granting Motion to Use Cash Collateral (Related Doc. #47), In re Lindsey, No.10-31694 (Bankr. E. 
D. Tenn. April 5, 2010); Agreed Order Granting Motion to Use Cash Collateral (Related Doc. #47), In re Lindsey, 
No-10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010)
55 F.R.B.P. R. 2004
56 Disclosure Statement, Exhibit 2, In re Lindsey, No.10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010)
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nature and purpose of certain property transfers.  At this point, Mr. Winchester is setting the 
stage for FirstBank’s major argument that immediately preceding the Chancery Court’s granting 
of its motion for summary judgment, Mr. Lindsey transferred his most lucrative assets to his 
family members so that the FirstBank would be unable to seize them following the entry of its 
judgment against Mr. Lindsey.
57
  These preferential transfers would be the subject of continued
contention throughout the administration of the bankruptcy case.   At this point, it’s worth noting 
that FirstBank has taken a relatively aggressive approach regarding Mr. Lindsey’s debt.  Given 
its sizeable judgment against Mr. Lindsey, this is hardly unexpected, but the suit on Mr. 
Lindsey’s personal guaranty may ultimately leave FirstBank with significantly less than had it 
chosen to negotiate an amicable settlement on the Eastland Capital loan, keeping Mr. Lindsey 
out of bankruptcy. 
Motions for relief from stay 
On June 23, 2010, Mr. Dickenson filed the first motion for relief from the automatic stay 
on behalf of Mountain National Bank.
58
  Mountain National Bank claimed that its collateral was
under-secured and continued to diminish in value due to the nature of the business conducted on 
the premises.
59
  Mr. Lindsey did not oppose the motion, and Mountain National was ultimately
granted relief from the say in order to foreclose upon its deed of trust.
60
57 Disclosure Statement, In re Lindsey at 5, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010). 
objection to disclosure statement; First Amended Disclosure Statement, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. 
Tenn. April 5, 2010); objection to amended disclosure statement 
58 Motion for Relief from Stay, In re Lindsey, No.10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
59 Included in the collateral property was the Weems Truss building, a truss manufacturing facility. Due to the
economic slow down, new construction projects were nearly nonexistent and the potential for growth in both
commercial and residential construction was suspect at best. Therefore, the truss business was becoming less and
less viable.
60 Order Granting Motion for Relief from Stay, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
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Extensions 
On August 31, 2010, Mr. Lindsey filed a motion to extend the exclusivity period for 
filing his plan and disclosure statement due to an expected round of chemotherapy in the coming 
month, which would leave him unable to finish his disclosure statement and Plan.
61
  Mr. Lindsey
also felt the additional 60 days would offer him further insight into the economic situation of 
several of his business investments.
62
  On September 30, 2010, Mr. Lindsey was granted the
additional exclusivity period.
63
  During this same time period, FirstBank sought to again extend
the deadline for filing a complaint as it continued to investigate Mr. Lindsey’s financial affairs 
and his pre-petition transfers.
64
  Although Mr. Lindsey objected to this extension, FirstBank was
given more time to determine what claim if any it had.
65
61 Motion to Extend Exclusivity Period for Filing a Chapter 11 Plan and Disclosure Statement, In re Lindsey, No. 
10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
62 Id.
63 Order Granting Motion to Extend Exclusivity Period for Filing a Chapter 11 Plan and Disclosure Statement, In re 
Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
64 Order Granting Second Motion to Extend Time to File 523 Complaint as to FirstBank, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 
(Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
65 Id.
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CHAPTER 5: ADVERSARY CASE 
On November 3, 2010, Mr. Lindsey, as debtor-in-possession, filed an adversary case 
against FirstBank seeking to avoid FirstBank’s recordation of its judgment lien as a preferential 
transfer pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
66
  Likewise, Mr. Lindsey claimed that FirstBank had
over/understated the value of the collateral securing its claim.
67
  Mr. Lindsey also points out that
multiple foreclosure sales had been scheduled; however, none were completed at the time of 
filing the adversary claim.
68
  FirstBank filed its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, which led Mr. Lindsey to file an amended complaint on 
December 23, 2010.
69
  On February 9, 2011, FirstBank filed its answer to Mr. Lindsey’s
complaint;
70
 however, shortly after submitting their discovery written report, FirstBank and Mr.
Lindsey filed an Agreed Judgment for Plaintiff against Defendant.
71
  FirstBank agreed that the
recordation of the judgment created a lien against Mr. Lindsey’s property in the nine counties 
and that such liens were preferential transfers pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 547(b).
72
  Nevertheless, the
other counts in Mr. Lindsey’s amended complaint were agreed moot.73  This adversary case is
further indication of the contentious nature of the relationship between Mr. Lindsey and 
FirstBank.  The opposition and litigation of this matter only served to prolong the entire 
bankruptcy and increase the legal fees for both parties. 
66 11 U.S.C. § 547 (b); Adversary case 3:10-ap-03112. Complaint by William Edwin Lindsey against FirstBank, In 
re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Lindsey v. FirstBank, Adversary Case No. 10-ap-03112, (Bankr. E. D.D. Tenn. 
November 3, 2010).
70 Answer to Amended Complaint, Lindsey v. FirstBank, Adversary Case No. 10-ap-03112, (Bankr. E. D.D. Tenn. 
November 3, 2010).
71 Agreed Judgment, Lindsey v. FirstBank, Adversary Case No. 10-ap-03112, (Bankr. E. D.D. Tenn. November 3, 
2010).
72 Id.
73 Id.
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CHAPTER 6: FIRST DISCLOSURE STATEMENT AND PLAN 
After a brief discussion of the case, the first Disclosure Statement sets out the current 
financial state of the estate, the specific business interests of Mr. Lindsey, and the business 
interests he transferred to his wife and daughter.
74
   Specifically, at the time of its filing, the
Disclosure Statement showed net income of the estate for the period since filing of $96,606.24.
75
However, the monthly income varied drastically (from over $56,000 in August to a loss of over 
$11,000 in April).
76
  The description of available assets listed seven pieces of real property with
varying amounts of equity scheduled.
77
  The Disclosure Statement also set out the value of the
scheduled business interests, and corrected the error of scheduling Old Capital Town, LLC, an 
interest transferred to Mr. Lindsey’s wife.78  Mr. Lindsey also claimed that at the time of
confirmation his monthly net income would exceed $13,000.
79
  Of that roughly $13,000,
$4,525.00 was listed as monthly expenses, which would leave less than $9,000 a month to 
service Mr. Lindsey’s debt.80  However, certain assets including, all the various entities
associated with Ultimate Toys Motor Sports, the Cocke County property, and Mr. Lindsey’s 
interest in WL/MC would be liquidated for the benefit of the secured creditors under the Plan.
81
Additionally, the first Plan divided the creditors into 12 classes, and provided for the Mr. 
Lindsey to retain his interest in certain business entities.
82
  The Plan provided for the sale of most
of the under-secured real estate with the deficiency being transferred as an unsecured claim.  
74 See generally Disclosure Statement, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn April 5, 2010).
75 Disclosure Statement, In re Lindsey at 11, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn April 5, 2010).
76 Id.
77 Only two of the seven properties were unencumbered, and one property was unscheduled. Disclosure statement,
In re Lindsey at 11, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn April 5, 2010).
78 Id. at 12.
79 Id. at 15.
80 Id.
81 Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn April 5, 2010).
82 Id.
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Additionally, the $8,340.00 monthly surplus would be distributed to unsecured creditors or to a 
segregated account should the unsecured claims not be fully determined.
83
  Although the first
Disclosure Statement and Plan further clarified the business interests which Mr. Lindsey 
transferred to his wife and daughter and cleared up some of the questions about his specific 
business interests, in the eyes of multiple creditors, he did not go far enough.   
Objection to Disclosure Statement 
The first Disclosure Statement garnered objections from FirstBank, Mountain National 
Bank, Pinnacle Financial Partners, and the U.S. Trustee, citing near identical grounds.
84
  The
main thrust of the four objections was a general lack of adequate information regarding Mr. 
Lindsey’s business holdings and certain transfers.85  Specifically, Mr. Lindsey’s failure to
provide P&L statements on entities, valuation reports to support Mr. Lindsey’s assertions 
regarding the value of his various interest, his relationship with affiliate companies, and detailed 
information about the allegedly fraudulent transfers to his wife and daughter.
86
  In addition,
Pinnacle Financial Partners and Mountain National Bank challenged the Debtor’s claim that the 
absolute priority rule did not apply to his individual Chapter 11 case.
87
  This is one of the more
divided issues throughout the country, and an issue that Judge Stair will be forced to wrestle with 
84 Response and Objection to Disclosure Statement Filed by Walter N. Winchester on behalf of Creditor FirstBank, 
In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010); Objection to (related document(s): 129 Disclosure
Statement filed by Debtor William Edwin Lindsey), In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010); 
Objection to (related document(s): 129 Disclosure Statement filed by Debtor William Edwin Lindsey), In re Lindsey, 
No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010); Objection to (related document(s): 129 Disclosure Statement filed 
by Debtor William Edwin Lindsey), In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010). 
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before the plan confirmation process will be able to continue.
88
  However, before the proceedings
could get to that point, Mr. Lindsey would be required to file an Amended Plan and an Amended 
Disclosure Statement. 
CHAPTER 7: FIRSTBANK, PINNACLE NATIONAL BANK, AND MOUNTAIN 
NATIONL BANK OBJECT TO THE PLAN AND MOVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Proposed Plan 
On April 6, 2011, Michael Fitzpatrick (“Fitzpatrick”), attorney for the debtor in 
possession, Mr. Lindsey, filed the Plan.
89
  The Plan identified twelve classes.
90
  The first class,
which was unimpaired, applied to administrative expenses.
91
  The second through tenth classes
identified the various secured claims, and were all impaired.
92
  The eleventh class belonged to
the general unsecured creditors, and twelfth class to the Debtor. Both the eleventh and twelfth 
classes were listed as impaired.
93
The Plan called for the Debtor to pay his administrative expenses in full, and to continue 
payment on the secured claims in classes 2-10.
 94
  Class 2 is Commercial Bank’s claim in Lot 88
Ladd Landing, Roane County.
95
  This claim arose from a note from Ultimate Toys Motorsports,
Inc.
96
  The lot will be sold and the proceeds will be paid to Commercial Bank, with any
deficiencies becoming a general unsecured claim.
97
  Class 3 was the pre-petition secured claim
of Greeneville Federal Bank for the disputed amount of $2,625,477.89 secured by the Debtor’s 
88 See infra Chapter 7.
89 Debtor’s First Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re Lindsey, No.10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010)
90 Id.
91 Id. Administrative expense claims specified by § 507(a)(1) include expenses allowed by the bankruptcy court and
the compensation of professionals, like lawyers and accountants.
92 Debtor’s First Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re Lindsey at___, No.10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5,
2010).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 8-15.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
21 
interest in 7111 Clinton Hwy., Lot 71 Coker Addn. real property of Lindsey Leasing, LLC, the 
Kingston Pike condominiums of Jefferson Plaza, LLC, and the condominium home of the Clarks 
(which will later be released from the stay).
98
 The notes are to be paid under the Plan, and any
deficiencies were to become general unsecured claims.
99
  Class 4 included the pre-petition,
secured claim of Lincoln National Life Insurance for $900,000.00 secured by the Cocke County 
sub-lease.
100
  This claim will “survive” the Plan and “remain in effect until…paid in full.”101
Although the Plan notes that Classes 2-10 are impaired, this claim does not appear to be truly 
impaired as it will be fully paid.  Class 5 is Pinnacle National Bank’s claim for $1,203,900.00 as 
secured by 10267 Kingston Pike, Knoxville, TN.
102
  The property was subsequently foreclosed
upon and sold for a $243,900.00 deficiency which has become a general unsecured claim.  Class 
6 is the second, pre-petition, secured claim of Pinnacle National Bank.
103
 This claim is for
$953,186.45 secured by an insurance claim for destroyed mining equipment owned by Lindsey 
Leasing, LLC.
104
  Under the Plan, Pinnacle will retain its lien on the insurance claim.
105
  Any
deficiency after recovery will become a general, unsecured claim.
106
  Class 7 is the pre-petition,
secured claim of FirstBank for $4,301,941.72 secured by the real property owned by the Debtor 
and pursuant to its judgments in several counties.
107
  This claim was disputed—Mr. Lindsey has
filed suit to avoid the lien, and was successful.
108
 This meant that the entire claim was relegated
98 Id. See infra Chapter 9 (discussing Greeneville’s motions for relief from the automatic stay).
99 Debtor’s First Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re Lindsey, No.10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010)
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See supra Chapter 5.
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to Class 11, as an unsecured claim.
109
 If, however, the lien had not been avoided and FirstBank
did not make an 1111(b) election, the property would have been sold at auction and only 
deficiencies would be unsecured.  Class 8 is the first the pre-petition, secured claim of Mountain 
National Bank for $413,762.44, secured by the Briarthicket Road, Cocke County property jointly 
owned by Mr. Lindsey and Mr. Davis.
110
  Mr. Lindsey intends to quit-claim the property to Mr.
Davis and allow Mountain National to deal directly with him.
111
  If there is equity in the
property, Mr. Lindsey will sell his interest to Mr. Davis rather than quit-claim it. Mountain 
National will be paid in full for this claim.
112
  Class 9, however, is the pre-petition secured claim
of Mountain National Bank for $809,802.86 secured by the real property of Samuel Spivey in 
Greene County, TN and will be treated differently.
113
 This claim will be treated as an unsecured
claim if there is a deficiency.
114
 Finally, Class 10 is the pre-petition secured claim of Regions
National Bank for $11,651,134.15 as a guarantor.
115
 These notes have been re-worked and the
claim will not be paid further.
116
In instances where a deficiency was expected for a secured claim, the deficiencies were 
to become general unsecured claims.
117
  Pinnacle National Bank held an unsecured deficiency
claim for $243,900.00, and other unsecured claims for $1,501,125.00 and $953,186.45.
118
Similarly, Mountain National Bank held unsecured claims for $916,920.95 and $200,866.45.
119
The general unsecured claims, comprising class 11 and detailed in Schedule F, were not expected 
109 Debtor’s First Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re Lindsey, No.10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010)
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
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to be paid in full.
120
  With regard to the unsecured class, the Plan specifically stated, “(t)his class
will NOT  be paid in full.”121  Furthermore, after re-stating that it was not anticipated that class
11 would be paid in full, the plan said “(i)t is not possible to calculate the dividend to be paid to 
Class 11 until the court determines the secured claims in Classes 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and  9 together 
with the resolution of the debtor’s other personal guaranty claims where no default by the maker 
has occurred.” 122
The Plan was to be implemented through the sale of property of the Debtor as designated 
within the Plan, the Debtor’s income, and the payments required by the Plan.123  Cash on hand
was to be used to pay the unsecured creditors after administrative expenses were paid, along with 
amortized notes from June and Danika Lindsey, and potential rent money from the Cocke 
County property.
124
  These sources could only account for up to $1, 275,000.00 in payments to
the unsecured creditors.
125
  After that, the unsecured creditors could be paid with the proceeds of
the liquidation of property as described by the Plan.
126
  The property named by the Plan to be
sold included the Debtor’s “interest in the Briarthicket Road property in Cocke County; his stock 
in Ultimate Toys Motorsports, Inc.; his membership in BTRG, LLC; his membership in Ultimate 
Toys, LLC; and his membership in WL & MC Development, LLC.”127
The Plan allowed for the Debtor to retain his interest in the majority of his assets, and 
stated that upon confirmation all property of the estate would vest in the Debtor.
128
  The Debtor’s
assets were specifically listed in the Debtor’s First Amended Disclosure Statement, and the 
120 See id. at 10.
121 Id. at 15.
122 Id. at 19.
123 Id. at 18-19
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
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Debtor intends to retain a majority of his assets.
129
  Several of the Debtor’s assets may have
limited value, and others’ values are uncertain.130  However, the Plan would allow the Debtor to
retain the majority of the assets at the expense of the unsecured creditors.  
As one might expect, Greenville Federal Bank (1 vote), Pinnacle National Bank (2 votes), 
Mountain National Bank (2 votes), and four unsecured creditor votes rejected the Plan.
131
Objections to the Plan 
As one of the primary creditors, and the creditor that pushed Mr. Lindsey into chapter 11, 
it is fitting that FirstBank filed the first objection to the Plan.
132
   Mr. Lindsey was able to avoid
FirstBank’s lien, leaving FirstBank with an unsecured claim. On behalf of FirstBank, FirstBank’s 
counsel Walt Winchester (“Winchester”) based his objection primarily on a lack of good faith 
(this argument will resurface later as well).
133
  According to Winchester, the Plan proposed
“inter-company loans that would preferentially benefit” insiders and included “self-dealing 
transfers” to insiders like June and Danika Lindsey.134 Winchester further complained that
because FirstBank is impaired, and has not accepted the Plan, and because FirstBank would 
receive more in a chapter 7 liquidation than it will under the Plan, that the Plan is not 
confirmable under section 1129 of the Code.
135
  Winchester also argued that the value of Mr.
Lindsey’s income over the next five years exceeded the value of property to be distributed under 
129 First Amended Disclosure Statement at Page, In re Lindsey at 14, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5,
2010).
130 Id.
131 Ballot Summary, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
132 Objection by FirstBank to Confirmation of Debtor’s First Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re Lindsey, No.
10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 2.
135 Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1129.
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the Plan.
136
  Finally, Winchester argued that the Plan violates the Absolute Priority Rule, making
it non-confirmable.
137
Following Winchester, Thomas Dickenson (“Dickenson”) (counsel for Mountain 
National Bank) and Mary Miller (“Miller”) (counsel for Greeneville Federal Bank) entered 
similar objections to the Plan.
138
  Dickenson and Miller surmised that the Plan was non-
confirmable because it was not proposed in good faith,
139
 because Mountain National and
Greenville did not accept the Plan,
140
 because Mountain National and Greeneville would receive
more in a chapter 7 liquidation than the Plan would allow, because the Plan is not feasible and 
the Debtor would need further reorganization following its confirmation,
141
 because the Debtor’s
income over the next five years will exceed the distributions under the Plan,
142
 because the
Debtor has not made appropriate financial reports,
143
 because the Plan is not fair and equitable,
144
and because the Plan violates the absolute priority rule.   Miller also argued that Greeneville’s 
collateral
145
 was not adequately protected.  Miller’s concern over depreciated collateral will lead
to future litigation.  
The United States Trustee, Patricia Foster, responded to Plan objections very plainly. 
The trustee deferred submitting an opinion regarding good faith, stated that it did not see any 
feasibility issues with the Plan, and stated that it did not have any objections based on the best 
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Objection to Confirmation of the Plan, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010). Objection 
to Confirmation of the Plan, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
139 Good faith is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).
140 Acceptance requirements are laid out by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
141 11 U.S.C. 1129(a)(8).
142 The value of the property may not be less than the debtor’s projected income for the next five years under 11
U.S.C. § 1 12 9(a)(15); income is calculated by 11 U.S.C. 1325(b)(2).
143 Required by 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(2).
144 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B).
145 Objection to Confirmation of the Plan, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
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interests of the creditors.
146
  A hearing was scheduled based on the objections, and motions for
summary judgment were filed.
147
Tom Dickenson files a motion for summary judgment objecting to the Plan on behalf of 
Pinnacle Bank and Mountain National Bank and Walt Winchester files a similar motion 
for summary judgment on behalf of FirstBank 
After objecting to the Plan, Dickenson and Winchester expounded on their final point—
that the Plan violated the “absolute priority rule,” and should not pass for that reason.  The 
absolute priority rule, codified in Section 1129(b)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, only allows a 
court to confirm a plan that provides for all of the dissenting creditors to be paid in full, or a plan 
that disallows creditors with claims junior to a dissenting creditor from retaining any property.
 148
Essentially, in chapter 11 reorganizations the absolute priority rule must be satisfied to “cram 
down” a class of dissenting creditors in order to prevent junior classes from receiving more than 
their share of the estate’s assets.149  In this case, Dickenson and Winchester argued that the
Debtor’s retention of assets under the Plan would allow the Debtor, as a junior class (class 12), to 
retain property even though the unsecured creditors, as a senior class (class 11), will not be paid 
in full.
150
  In his First Amended Disclosure Statement, filed February 21, 2011, the Debtor
asserted that the absolute priority rule only applies to business’s chapter 11 reorganizations—not 
146 See Response of United States Trustee to Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. 
E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
147 Id.
148 Absolute Priority Rule: (B)With respect to a class of unsecured claims--(i)the plan provides that each holder of
a claim of such class receive or retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the 
plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or (ii)the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims 
of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property, except 
that in a case in which the debtor is an individual, the debtor may retain property included in the estate under section 
1115, subject to the requirements of subsection (a)(14) of this section. 11. U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2)(B).
149 Id.
150 Motions for Summary Judgment, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2011); Motions for 
Summary Judgment, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2011).
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to individual cases.
151
  Dickenson and Winchester, however, argued that the absolute priority rule
applies to individual chapter 11 cases, and therefore applies in this case.
152
Dickenson specifically argued that sections 1129(b)(2)(B) and 1115 of the Code should 
be interpreted using their plain language to enforce the absolute priority rule.
153
  Section 1115
allows an individual chapter 11 debtor to retain property acquired post-petition and earnings 
from services performed post-petition.
154
  Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) allows the debtor to retain
property as described in Section 1115, potentially creating an exception to the absolute priority 
rule.  Dickenson’s reading of the statutes would allow an individual chapter 11 debtor to retain 
post-petition property, but not pre-petition property as both sections are silent with regard to 
retention of pre-petition property.
155
  Some courts, however, read the sections together to
eliminate the absolute priority rule in individual chapter 11 cases.
156
Dickenson maintained that the courts that would abrogate the absolute priority rule are 
incorrect.
157
   Those courts looked to legislative history, but according to Dickenson the statutory
151 First Amended Disclosure Statement at Page, In re Lindsey at 14, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 
2010).
152 Motions for Summary Judgment, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2011); Motions for
Summary Judgment, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2011).
153 Motions for Summary Judgment, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2011).
154 Section 1115: a) In a case in which the debtor is an individual, property of the estate includes, in addition to the
property specified in section 541—(1) all property of the kind specified in section 541 that the debtor acquires after 
the commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 12, or
13, whichever occurs first; and (2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the commencement of the 
case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13, whichever occurs 
first. (b) Except as provided in section 1104 or a confirmed plan or order confirming a plan, the debtor shall remain
in possession of all property of the estate. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1115.
155 Motions for Summary Judgment, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2011)
156 See generally Reply to Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694, (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April
5, 2010) (discussing cases favoring eliminating the absolute priority rule in its legal argument).
157 Motions for Summary Judgment, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2011).
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language is clear.
158
  Furthermore, the history does not state that Congress intended to abolish the
absolute priority rule, and if Congress had meant to do so it could have done so with clear 
language.
159
  Dickenson conceded that the legislative history of Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) shows that Congress intended to make individual chapter 
11 cases more like chapter 13 cases, but still argued that in adopting the new laws Congress is 
presumed to be aware of the old law.
160
  Following this logic, Dickenson argued that Congress
was aware that the absolute priority law applied to individual chapter 11 cases, and would have 
made significant changes if it meant to eliminate the absolute priority rule.
161
  Dickenson
believes that majority view is in line with his approach—it employs a plain language reading of 
the statutes and continues to apply the absolute priority rule in individual chapter 11 cases.
162
Pinnacle National Bank holds an unsecured, deficiency claim for $243,900.00 that arose 
after Pinnacle foreclosed on the 10267 Kingston Pike property.
163
  At the foreclosure sale the
highest bid was $960,000, which created the $243,900.00 deficiency, and unsecured claim for 
Pinnacle.
164
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Winchester joined Dickenson and incorporated the 
legal arguments Dickenson made in his motion.
165
  Winchester further argued that section
1129(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code provided further guidance by stating that a court may not 
confirm a chapter 11 plan unless each impaired class accepts the plan or, according to section 
1129(b)(1) the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable to impaired 
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Lindsey, No.
10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
164 Id.
165 Motions for Summary Judgment, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2011).
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classes.
166
  Winchester argued that for a plan to be deemed fair and equitable, it must follow the
absolute priority rule, and grant creditors priority over parties whose interests are in equity.
167
Winchester expanded Dickenson’s arguments to include a recent Virginia case, In re Maharaj, 
which held in favor of applying the absolute priority rule to individual chapter 11 cases.
168
  The
court explained that if Congress intended to eliminate the absolute priority rule through the 
BAPCPA amendments, it could have, and would have done so with a clear change—not section 
1115.
169
  Furthermore, if Congress had intended to make chapter 11 cases akin to chapter 13
cases, it could have simply changed the debt ceilings for chapter 13.
170
  Winchester further
clarified that confirming the Plan would allow the Debtor to retain most of his assets, and under 
the Plan those assets would vest in the Debtor upon confirmation.
171
Both Dickenson and Winchester noted that the Debtor has various pre-petition assets that 
include real property and business interests, but that the Debtor’s Plan only requires the Debtor 
to sell a small portion of his assets.  In their view, allowing the Debtor to retain assets without 
paying the unsecured claims in full violates the absolute priority rule, and is grounds to deny 
confirmation of the Plan. 
Naturally, the Debtor opposed Dickenson and Winchester’s motions for summary 
judgment.
172
  Michael Fitzpatrick, counsel for the Debtor from Jenkins and Jenkins, LLC, began
his Brief in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment by acknowledging the statutory 
limits barring some individuals from filing for chapter 13 as set forth in section 109(e) of the 
166 Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1129
167 Motions for Summary Judgment, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2011).
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Brief in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn.
April 5, 2010).
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Code.
173
  Of course, individuals that want to reorganize may file chapter 11 instead of chapter
13, but are bound by the rules governing chapter 11 reorganization. Like Dickenson and 
Winchester, Fitzpatrick recognized section 1129(b)(1) of the Code’s requirement that in order to 
confirm a plan over the objections of dissenting creditors, the dissenters need to be treated fairly 
and equitably as defined by the absolute priority rule.
174
  According to Fitzpatrick, however, the
BAPCPA amendments and the addition of section 1115 re-define property of the estate as it 
applies to individual, chapter 11 creditors.
175
  Ultimately, Fitzpatrick contended that reading
sections 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (with its reference to section 1115) and 1115  together excludes 
individual chapter 11 debtors from the absolute priority rule.
176
  Despite Dickenson and
Winchester’s argument that there is a growing majority maintaining the absolute priority rule, 
Fitzpatrick stated that there is a split of authority and no controlling decision in the Sixth 
Circuit.
177
Fitzpatrick further argued that section 1129’s phrase “included in the estate under section 
1115” may be read so broadly as to use section 1115 instead of section 541 in defining property 
of the estate for individual chapter 11 creditors.
178
  According to Fitzpatrick, this is in line with
the effect of the other BAPCPA amendments because they have the overall effect of making 
individual chapter 11 cases more like chapter 13 cases.
179
 If Congress intended to make
individual chapter 11 cases more like chapter 13 cases, then it is possible that Congress did in 
fact intend to abrogate the absolute priority rule as it applies to individual chapter 11 debtors.  In 
one case, In re Shat, the court accepted the argument that prior to the BAPCPA amendments, 
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
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individual chapter 11 debtors were not generally able to comply with the absolute priority rule 
and cram down dissenting creditors in the same way business debtors could.
180
Fitzpatrick walked through several other cases, and argued that the under case law and 
the statutory language, the meaning of sections 1129 and 1115 is clear—the absolute priority rule 
no longer applies to individual chapter 11 debtors because section 1129 incorporates 1115, and 
1115 supplants section 541.
181
  Furthermore, Fitzpatrick emphasized that the word “included” in
section 1129 does not mean “added,” which would provide a narrow interpretation.182  Instead,
included should be read broadly, so that section 1115 may replace section 541.  By replacing 
section 541, section 1115 re-defined property of the estate as it applies to individual chapter 11 
debtors and took the teeth out of the absolute priority rule in their cases.
183
  After highlighting the
cases that favored eliminating the absolute priority rule, Fitzpatrick looked to opinions contrary 
to his position.
184
  Interestingly, In re Maharaj, the case Winchester relied on, held that if
Congress intended to make chapter 11 more like 13 for individual debtors it could have simply 
removed the debt ceilings, but Fitzpatrick pointed out that chapter 13 plans differ in other ways, 
so removing the debt ceiling would not have worked.
185
  Specifically, chapter 13 plans have a
maximum term for plans, while chapter 11 plans have a minimum plan length.   
Judge Stair holds in Favor of the Creditors 
Judge Stair reviewed the judicial record and then carefully listed the property Mr. 
Lindsey proposed to sell under the Plan and the property Mr. Lindsey would retain under the 
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
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Plan.
186
  In light of the property Mr. Lindsey hoped to retain, and the applicability of the absolute
priority rule, Judge Stair granted Winchester and Dickenson’s motions for summary judgment.187
Judge Stair specifically stated that the absolute priority rule was enacted to limit the danger in 
allowing a debtor to create a plan that benefits him or herself at the expense of the creditors.
188
Judge Stair looked to the plain language of section 1129(b)(2)(B) and section 1115 of the Code, 
and acknowledged that the language was ambiguous, and may allow section 1115 to supplant 
section 541 and redefine the property interests of the debtor.
189
  However, a more narrow reading
would mean that section 1115 merely amends section 541.  Essentially, the phrase “included in 
the estate” in section 1129(b)(2)(B) could allow the absolute priority rule to survive, or to die in 
individual chapter 11 cases.  Judge Stair examined the legislative history of the BAPCPA 
amendments and the various cases on point, and ultimately agreed with Mr. Lindsey’s contention 
that BAPCPA aimed to make chapter 11 for individuals more like chapter 13, but that Congress 
did not intend to eliminate the absolute priority rule to do so.
190
  According to Judge Stair, the
BAPCPA amendments were designed to uphold the integrity of the bankruptcy system, and the 
effect of eliminating the absolute priority rule would give debtors an unfair advantage—they 
would be able to create an inequitable plan and leave the creditors without recourse.
191
  Judge
Stair held that a narrow interpretation of section 1115 was more logical, and thus held that the 
absolute priority rule applies to individual chapter 11 debtors, and applies in this case.
192
186 Memorandum containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, In re Lindsey at 3-4, No. 10-31694 
(Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
187 Id. at 30.
188 Id. at 9.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. See also Order, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-3169 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
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Mr. Lindsey Appeals 
Following Judge Stair’s grant of summary judgment and denial of the Debtor’s plan of 
reorganization filed on August 5, 2011,
193
 Mr. Lindsey filed a notice of appeal on August 10,
2011.
194
 A week after Judge Stair entered the order granting Mr. Lindsey’s motion to transfer his
membership interest in Jefferson Plaza, LLC to Mr. Whitley, Mr. Lindsey filed a designation of 
record on appeal and statement of the issues.
195
  The issue on appeal was set forth by Mr.
Lindsey and his counsel as “[d]id the changes to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and the addition 
of § 1115 caused by the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 abrogate the “absolute priority rule” altogether in individual Chapter 11 
cases.
196
  The motion designated the following 15 items for inclusion in the record on appeal
197
:
1. 6/27/11 Motion for Summary Judgment of Mountain National Bank and Pinnacle
National Bank (docket #210)
2. 6/27/11 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts of Mountain National Bank and Pinnacle
National Bank (docket #210)
3. 6/27/11 Brief of Mountain National Bank and Pinnacle National Bank (docket #211)
4. 7/12/11 Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting Memorandum of FirstBank
(docket #214)
5. 7/12/11 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts of FirstBank (docket #215)
6. 7/18/2011 Reply to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts of William Lindsey (docket
#221)
193 Order, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-3169 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
194 William E. Lindsey Notice of Appeal, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-3169 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
195 William E. Lindsey Designation of Record on Appeal and Statement of the Issues, In re Lindsey at 1. 10-3169
(Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
196 Id.
197 Id.
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7. 7/18/11 Response to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts of William Lindsey (Docket
#222)
8. 7/18/11 Brief of William Lindsey (docket #224)
9. 7/26/11 Reply to Motion for Summary Judgment of William Lindsey (docket #228)
10. 7/26/11 Brief of William Lindsey (docket #229)
11. 7/26/11 Response to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts of William Lindsey (docket
#230)
12. 8/5/11 Memorandum containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket #24)
13. 8/5/11 Order Granting Summary Judgment (docket #241)
14. 8/10/11 Notice of Appeal (docket #246)
15. 8/11/11 Certificate of Notice (docket #255)
Following Mr. Lindsey’s designation of the record,198 FirstBank filed a motion designating
additional items to be included on the record of appeal.
199
  These additional items included:
16. 1/5/11 Objection to Disclosure Statement by FirstBank (docket #146)
17. 2/21/11 First Amended Disclosure Statement and Exhibits thereto (docket #168)
18. 2/21/11 First Amended Chapter 11 Plan (docket #169)
19. 3/16/11 Agreed Judgment in Adversary Proceeding No. 10-03112
20. 4/7/11 FirstBank’s Objection to Confirmation (docket #195)
21. 4/13/11 Summary of Ballots (docket #200)
22. 7/23/10 FirstBank’s Proof of Claim
On September 9, 2011, the official record on appeal was set out by the Bankruptcy Court.
200
  Just
a few days later, FirstBank moved to dismiss.
 201
198 Id.
199 FirstBank’s Designation of Additional Items to Be Included in the Record on Appeal, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 
10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
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CHAPTER 8: ALBERT HAYNESWORTH OBJECTS 
More than a year after Mr. Lindsey filed his voluntary petition for bankruptcy a new 
creditor, Albert Haynesworth III, 
202
 a professional football player, friend, and business partner
with Mr. Lindsey filed an objection to the Plan (through counsel, Lynn Tarpy).
203
 According to
the motion, Mr. Haynesworth believed himself to be a creditor, but was not informed of the 
bankruptcy filing until late June, 2011.
204
 Mr. Haynesworth included an email Mr. Lindsey sent
complaining about his financial predicament as his first (and very informal) notice of Mr. 
Lindsey’s bankruptcy proceedings.205 The email detailed Mr. Lindsey’s transfer of business
interests and further investments, leading Mr. Haynesworth to believe that Mr. Lindsey 
intentionally excluded Mr. Haynesworth from the proceedings.
206
 Mr. Haynesworth and a third
party, Terry Lewis, were guarantors on one of Mr. Lindsey’s notes at Mountain National 
Bank.
207
 The note was for $169,000.00.
208
  Mr. Haynesworth is a guarantor on other debt and is a
member to several of Mr. Lindsey’s companies.209 Haynesworth is (or would become) a member
to Ultimate Toys Motorsports, Inc., Ultimate Toys, Inc., and BTRG, LLC, therefore giving Mr. 
Haynesworth a a right of first refusal to the transfer of Mr. Lindsey’s debts.210 Each of these
business interests are to be sold to satisfy other debts under the Plan.
211
 Mr. Haynesworth also
200 Record on Appeal, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
201 Motion by FirstBank for Dismissal of Chapter 11 Case, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. 
April 5, 2010). See supra, Chapter 10.
202 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Haynesworth
203 Objection to Confirmation of the Plan, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
204 Id.
205 Id., Exhibit 1
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Debtor’s First Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re Lindsey, No.10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
36 
guaranteed a note for Mr. Lindsey on the Lot 88 Ladd Landing property.
212
  Mr. Haynesworth
further objected to the transfers made to June and Danika Lindsey as being made to “hinder, 
delay and defraud” creditors—including Mr. Haynesworth.213 Mr. Tarpy closed his motion by
incorporating the objections made by other creditors. 
212 Objection to Confirmation of the Plan, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).(Claim for 
Commercial Bank, Class 2). 
213 Id. 
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CHAPTER 9: GREENEVILLE REQUESTS RELIEF FROM THE STAY 
Clinton Highway Motion 
Miller, on behalf of Greeneville Federal Bank, moved for relief from the automatic stay 
and abandonment, or, alternatively, for adequate protection on January 20, 2011.
214
  Greeneville
Federal Bank is a secured creditor, and has a note executed by the Debtor for $276,290.00 
secured by real property located on Clinton Highway in Knox County, Tennessee.
215
Greeneville Federal Bank has a second note executed by one of the Debtor’s companies, Lindsey 
Leasing, LLC.  The second note is for $115,000.00 and secured by the Clinton Highway property 
and another property located at 1616 Washington Pike, Knox County, Tennessee.
216
  The Debtor
personally guaranteed the second note.  Another one of the Debtor’s business interests, Jefferson 
Plaza, LLC, held a third note, also guaranteed by the Debtor.
217
 This note was for $1,629,000.00
and was guaranteed up to $814,500.00.
218
  Property located at 101Sherlake Lane, Knox County
Tennessee (which was not part of the bankruptcy estate), along with the Clinton Highway 
property secured the third note.
219
  The final note, executed by the Debtor and two partners
(Michael Strickland and Anthony Woods), was originally for $502,500.00 and then renewed for 
$248,149.20 was also secured by the Clinton Highway property.
220
The combined, outstanding balance on the four notes is $2,625,477.89.
221
  The Clinton
Highway property that secured the notes is valued at $539,900.00, and the Debtor has a half 
214 Motion for Relief from Stay and Abandonment, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5,
2010).
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
38 
interest in the property.
222
  There is no equity in the property, and Miller argued that it is not
necessary for a successful reorganization.
223
  Furthermore, the property is depreciating, meaning
Greeneville Federal Bank was not adequately protected.
224
  Greeneville Federal hoped to
foreclose on the property and recover from the Debtor, Lindsey Leasing, Michael Strickland, and 
Anthony Woods, so Miller requested relief from the stay and abandonment of the Clinton 
Highway Property.
225
Approximately one month after Miller filed her motion for relief, the bankruptcy court 
entered an agreed order allowing the automatic stay to remain in effect until further ordered.
226
Just over a month after the agreed order was entered, the court granted Miller’s motion for 
adequate protection (but did not lift the stay).
227
  The court further ordered the Debtor to pay
Greeneville Federal Bank $1,800.00 monthly as adequate protection for the Clinton Highway 
property.
228
 The order further stated that if the Debtor is delinquent, Greeneville Federal may
foreclose.
229
  Furthermore, Greeneville Federal received a post-petition lien on the Clinton
Highway property and on any profits derived from it. Later, when a Chapter 11 Trustee was 
appointed, the order was amended to allow the trustee, rather than Mr. Lindsey, to make monthly 
payments.
230
  On March 9, 2012, Miller entered a second motion requesting relief from the
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Agreed Order Providing for Stay to Remain in Effect as to the claim of Greeneville Federal Bank Pending
Further Order of the Court, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
227 Order Granting Motion For Relief From Stay and Abandonment or In The Alternative Adequate Protection, In
re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2011).
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Amended Agreed Order Granting Amended Motion for Relief From Stay and Abandonment or In The Alternative 
Adequate Protection, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
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automatic stay with regard to the Clinton Highway Property.
231
  This motion is currently
pending. 
Clarks’ Condominium Motion 
Miller filed a second motion for relief from the stay and abandonment, or, in the 
alternative for adequate protection on behalf of Greeneville Federal Bank on June 23, 2011.
232
In this motion, Miller requested relief for two condominiums owned by Phillip and Joan Clark.
233
The condominiums secured a note executed by the Clarks and guaranteed by Mr. Lindsey up to 
$84,000.00.
234
  The balance on the note is $419,979.00 and the value of the property is
$386,200.00, so there is no equity in the property.
235
  For this reason, Mr. Lindsey does not have
an interest in the property, the property does not benefit the estate, and is not necessary for a 
successful reorganization.
236
  Approximately one month after Miller’s motion was filed, and after
a hearing, the court granted Greeneville Federal Bank relief from the stay and recover its 
property.
237
231 Motion for Relief from Stay and Abandonment, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
232 Motion for Relief from Stay and Abandonment, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Order Granting Motion For Relief From Stay and Abandonment or in the Alternative Adequate Protection, In
re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
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CHAPTER 10: FIRSTBANK MOVES TO DISMISS 
FirstBank, as the primary creditor and catalyst to bankruptcy, proved to be the most 
aggressive creditor throughout the proceedings. On September 12, 2011, Winchester filed a 
motion for dismissal on behalf of FirstBank.
238
  Winchester cited several causes for dismissal
beginning with the Debtor’s actions FirstBank believed to be made in bad faith.239  These bad
faith actions began with Mr. Lindsey concealing that a loan he made was secured by real 
property.
240
  Mr. Lindsey collected the collateral securing that note, and transferred it to his
daughter rather than the estate.
241
  Next, according to Winchester, Mr. Lindsey inappropriately
conveyed business interests in exchange for assumption of debt (as revealed by his emails to 
Albert Haynesworth).
242
  Winchester asserted that Mr. Lindsey was also diminishing the
bankruptcy estate by continuing to transfer his interest in assets post-petition including his 
renewal of a lease without the Bankruptcy Court’s authority, the discussion of which follows this 
section.
243
  Mr. Lindsey entered into a lease with Flower’s Baking Company without reflecting
the lease in his Amended Disclosure Statement, even though it was necessary for valuing the 
collateral (the collateral would have significantly less value if the lease were not renewed).
244
Furthermore, Mr. Lindsey has made inter-company loans to benefit his business partner, Matt 
Caldwell and has made preferential transfers to benefit his wife and daughter.
245
  These transfers
(among other things) were the subject of prior objections to the Plan.  Finally, Winchester argued 
238 Motion to Dismiss, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 See infra Chapter 12.
245 Motion to Dismiss, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
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that Mr. Lindsey was abusing the fact that his spending habits were not being closely 
monitored.
246
Winchester further argued that there is cause (i.e. bad faith), and when it is in the best 
interests of the creditors and the estate section 1112(b) of the Code calls for dismissal or 
conversion to chapter 7.
247
  In this case, Winchester has requested dismissal.
248
  Mr. Lindsey
opposed Winchester’s motion, and after brokering a deal that brought a trustee into the 
proceedings FirstBank withdrew its motion to dismiss.
249
246 Motion to Dismiss at 13, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010). 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 See infra Chapter 16. 
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CHAPTER 11: LINDSEY TRANSFERS MEMBERSHIP INTEREST IN JEFFERSON 
PLAZA, LLC 
While the bankruptcy proceeding slowly continued, Mr. Lindsey maintained his partial 
membership interests in multiple entities and properties throughout East Tennessee.  As 
previously mentioned, Mr. Lindsey held most of these real estate assets in separate limited 
liability companies.  For years, real estate developers and their business partners have favored 
limited liability companies over other forms of business entities because it combines the benefits 
of a corporation with those of a limited partnership.
250
  As explained by Sally Neely in the
American Bankruptcy Law Journal, “the express purpose of the LLC business form is to achieve 
the limited liability of a corporation without the rigidity and formality of the corporate form, 
while simultaneously obtaining the pass-through tax treatment afforded partnerships.”251  A
limited liability company shields owners from personal liability protecting the owners from both 
contract and tort obligations of the business entity.
252
  Beyond creating limited liability
companies to hold their real estate assets, developers often form multiple LLCs placing one real 
estate asset in each LLC.
253
With Mr. Lindsey’s health continuing to decline, his primary focus quickly began to shift 
from protecting himself to protecting his family and his business partners.  By creating multiple 
limited liability companies to hold his real estate assets, Mr. Lindsey opened up multiple ways of 
protecting his family and business partners through transferring his membership interests in the 
LLCs.  By removing the Debtor from the LLC, this opened up the possibility that banks would 
250 Bernie R. Kray, Comment, Respecting the Concept and Limited Liability of a Series LLC in Texas, 42 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 501, 501-02 (2011). 
251 Sally S. Neely, Partnerships and Partners and Limited Liability Companies and Members in Bankruptcy: 
Proposals for Reform, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 271, 281 (1997). 
252 Bernie R. Kray, Comment, Respecting the Concept and Limited Liability of a Series LLC in Texas, 42 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 501, 502 (2011). 
253 Id. 
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restructure and modify the loans.  Mr. Lindsey first attempted this when he filed a motion on 
July 1, 2011 to transfer his membership interest in Jefferson Plaza, LLC to Steve Whitley.
254
Mr. Lindsey had a 50% membership interest in Jefferson Plaza, LLC.
255
  Jefferson Plaza,
LLC’s only asset was the office complex called Jefferson Plaza located at 101 Sherlake Lane, 
Knoxville, TN.
256
  Mr. Whitley held the remaining 50% membership interest.
257
  The motion
stated that the property was encumbered by a $1,577,699.30 lien held by Greenville Federal 
Bank, and Mr. Lindsey signed a personal guaranty of the debt up to $814,500.00.
258
  The
appraised value of the property was currently $1,450,000.00, so the property appeared to have no 
equity.
259
  The motion explained that the Mr. Lindsey’s membership interest, therefore, had no
value and was burdensome to the estate.
260
  Mr. Lindsey’s motion requested approval by the
bankruptcy court of the sale of his membership interest in Jefferson Plaza, LLC pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 363(b).
261
  The motion further provided that Mr. Lindsey’s personal guaranty would be
discharged upon the transfer of his membership interest and that Mr. Whitley would personally 
guarantee the entire loan to Greenville Federal Bank.
262
  A hearing on this motion was set for
July 28, 2011 at 10:00am.   
Section 363(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the use, sale or lease of property of the 
estate, other than in the ordinary course of business, after notice and a hearing in the bankruptcy 
court.
263
  Notice of the sale is required under this section in order to provide parties with an
254 Debtor’s Motion to Transfer Membership in Jefferson Plaza, LLC Subject to Liens.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012).
262 Id.
263 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2012).
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opportunity to object and to be heard before the bankruptcy court.
264
  As explained by Professor
George Kuney, “[s]ection 363(b)(1) prevents the debtor from completing a transaction that 
would harm the estate by negating any transfer made outside the ordinary scope of business 
without prior notice and a hearing.
265
  However, by transferring assets preconfirmation under
section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor merely has to provide notice and attend a hearing 
rather than the lengthy and burdensome process involved in a traditional confirmation process.
266
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363, FirstBank, as a party-in-interest, filed a timely objection to 
Mr. Lindsey’s request to transfer his membership interest in Jefferson Plaza, LLC to Mr. 
Whitley.
267
  FirstBank objected to the proposed transfer on the basis that it was not provided with
a copy of the appraisal of the property stating that the value of the property is $1,450,000.00, 
which was referenced in Mr. Lindsey’s motion.268  FirstBank’s motion also explained that the
Debtor’s Rule 2004 Exam placed the value of the property at $1,900,000.00 and that the Debtor 
had also stated that the property was previously listed for $300,000 per unit for a total value of 
$2,100,000.00.
269
  Because the value of the property was not clear and there was a possibility
that there was equity in the property, FirstBank objected to the motion to transfer the Debtor’s 
membership interest until proof of the current property value was provided.
270
  FirstBank’s
second objection to the Debtor’s motion is on the basis that the property produces an income 
stream sufficient to service the debt to Greenville Federal Bank.
271
  Finally, FirstBank objected
to the Debtor’s motion on the ground that no records, books financial data or other information 
264 In re Karpe, 84 B.R. 926 (BC MD Pa 1988).
265 George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 77-78 (2004).
266 Id. at 107.
267 Objection by FirstBank to Debtor’s Motion to Transfer Membership In Jefferson Plaza, LLC Subject to Liens,
In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
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had been provided for Jefferson Plaza, LLC and because Jefferson Plaza, LLC appeared to have 
been administratively dissolved as of August 8, 2010.
272
  FirstBank explained that based on this
lack of data and uncertainity in the property value, it was unable to make an educated 
determination of the potential value of the Debtor’s membership interest in the entity.273  The
July 28, 2011 hearing on the Debtor’s motion was continued and reset for August 4, 2011.  The 
August 4, 2011 hearing on this matter was also continued and reset for August 11, 2011. 
On August 11, 2011, affidavits of Mr. Lindsey
274
, Mr. Whitley
275
 and Ralph Boswell
276
were filed regarding the July 1, 2011 motion to transfer Mr. Lindsey’s membership interest in 
Jefferson Plaza, LLC.   Mr. Lindsey and Mr. Whitley’s affidavits stated that Jefferson Plaza was 
a Tennessee Limited Liability Company which owned the office complex located at 101 
Sherlake Lake, Knoxville, TN 37922.
277
  The complex owned by Jefferson Plaza consists of 7
office condo units located off of Kingston Pike.
278
  The affidavits also confirmed that the
property was purchased on October 31, 2006 for $1,500,000.00 and that Greenville Federal Bank 
had an initial lien on the property for $1,600,000, which later increased to $1,629,000.00.
279
Jefferson Plaza’s only asset was this office complex, and Mr. Lindsey and Mr. Whitley were the 
only parties with a membership interest in the company.
280
Mr. Boswell is the senior vice-president for Greenville Federal Bank, and he is 
responsible for overseeing the loans and lending relationship with Mr. Lindsey at Greenville 
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Affidavit of William E. Lindsey In Support of Greenville Federal Bank’s Motion to Sell Debtor’s Interest in 
Jefferson Plaza, LLC, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
275 Affidavit of Stephen G. Whiley In Support of Debtor’s Motion to Transfer Membership In Jefferson Plaza, LLC 
Subject to Liens, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
276 Affidavit of Ralph Boswell In Support of Debtor’s Motion to Transfer Membership In Jefferson Plaza, LLC 
Subject to Liens, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
277 Id.
278 First Amended Disclosure Statement at Page, In re Lindsey at 14, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 
2010).
279 Id.
280 Id.
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Federal Bank.
281
  Boswell stated in his affidavit that he was responsible for the August 22, 2008
loan of $1,629,000.00 that Greenville Federal Bank made to Jefferson Plaza, LLC, which was 
personally guaranteed by both Mr. Lindsey and Mr. Whitley.
282
  Mr. Boswell also explained in
the affidavit that the $1,629,000 loan to Jefferson Plaza was currently past due.
283
  When the loan
first became past due, Greenville Federal Bank attempted to restructure and modify the loan.
284
However, Greenville Federal Bank would not modify the loan without approval from the 
Bankruptcy Court where Mr. Lindsey’s bankruptcy case was filed.285  Boswell explained in the
affidavit that if Greenville Federal Bank modified the loan without approval from the 
Bankruptcy Court, it would be taking the risk that Mr. Lindsey’s obligations under the guaranty 
would be released in the bankruptcy proceeding.
286
  However, Greenville Federal Bank agreed to
modify the loan and release Mr. Lindsey from his guarantee if Mr. Lindsey transferred his entire 
membership interest in Jefferson Plaza, LLC to Mr. Whitley and Mr. Whitley agreed to increase 
his guarantee to the full amount of the loan.
287
The affidavits set out that Mr. Lindsey would transfer his 50% membership interest in 
Jefferson Plaza to Mr. Whitley without receiving any compensation.
288
  In exchange for Mr.
Lindsey’s transfer of his membership interest in Jefferson Plaza, LLC, Greenville Federal Bank 
would release Mr. Lindsey from his personal guaranty permitting Greenville Federal Bank to 
restructure and modify the Jefferson Plaza loan.
289
  Also on August 11, 2011, based on its review
281 Affidavit of Ralph Boswell In Support of Debtor’s Motion to Transfer Membership In Jefferson Plaza,
LLC Subject to Liens, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
282 Id at 2.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Affidavit of Ralph Boswell In Support of Debtor’s Motion to Transfer Membership In Jefferson Plaza,
LLC Subject to Liens, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
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of Mr. Boswell’s affidavit and other documentation provided by Greenville Federal Bank 
regarding the property and its current value, FirstBank withdrew its objection
290
 to Mr. Lindsey’s
motion to transfer his membership interest in Jefferson Plaza, LLC.
291
A hearing on Mr. Lindsey’s motion to transfer his membership interest in Jefferson Plaza, 
LLC
292
 was held on August 11, 2011.  Judge Richard Stair granted Mr. Lindsey’s motion and
filed an order on August 11, 2011 granting Mr. Lindsey’s request to transfer his 50% interest in 
Jefferson Plaza, LLC to Mr. Whitley subject to any existing liens.
293
  In consideration for this
transfer, Greenville Federal Bank extinguished Mr. Lindsey’s guaranty agreement and Mr. 
Whitley guaranteed the entire loan.   
290 FirstBank’s Objection to Lindsey’s Motion to Transfer Jefferson Plaza Interest, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-3169 
(Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).  
291 Withdraw of Objection by FirstBank to Debtor’s Motion to Transfer Membership in Jefferson Plaza, LLC Subject 
to Liens, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-3169 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).  
292 Debtor’s Motion to Transfer Membership In Jefferson Plaza, LLC Subject to Liens, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 
10-3169 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).  
293 Order for Sale of Membership in Jefferson Plaza, LLC Subject to Liens, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-3169 (Bankr. 
E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010). 
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CHAPTER 12: MR. LINDSEY VIOLATES THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND RENEWS 
FLOWERS BAKING COMPANY’S LEASE 
Two and a half weeks after transferring his membership interest in Jefferson Plaza, LLC 
to Mr. Whitley, Mr. Lindsey filed a motion to enter into a real property lease.
294
  Mr. Lindsey
owned 50% of a property in Knox County, Tennessee located at 7111 Clinton Highway, 
Knoxville, Tennessee.
295
  Mr. Lindsey owned the property jointly with his business partner, Matt
Caldwell, in a partnership named L & C Properties Partnership.
296
  The property is subject to
Greenville Federal Bank’s lien in the amount of $1,577,699.30.297  While Mr. Lindsey and Mr.
Caldwell owned the property as tenants in common, there was a lien on only Mr. Lindsey’s 50% 
interest.
298
  However, another entity, Woodstrick, LLC, was making the payments on the
Greenville Federal note.
299
 The note was interest only until December 28, 2010 when it became
due in full.
300
  At the time Mr. Lindsey filed for bankruptcy, the payments were current to the
best of Mr. Lindsey’s knowledge.301
When Mr. Lindsey filed for bankruptcy, the property was leased to Flowers Baking 
Company of Morristown, Inc. as a month-to-month tenant.
302
  The First Amended Disclosure
Statement explained that the value of the property was both directly and greatly affected by 
whether or not Flowers Baking Company renewed its lease.
303
  The property appears to be a
294 Debtor’s Motion to Enter Into Real Property Lease, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 
2010).
295 First Amended Disclosure Statement, In re Lindsey at 27, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
296 Id.
297 Debtor’s Motion to Enter into Real Property Lease, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 
2010).
298 Id.
299 First Amended Disclosure Statement, In re Lindsey at 27, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id.
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somewhat unimpressive factory building located on Clinton Highway.  Because of the buildings 
size, location, and appearance, it was assumed that the property would be suitable for only a very 
particular type of tenant.  Flowers Baking Company had leased the property since 1990 and was 
most likely the only potential tenant willing to sign another ten year lease at a reasonable 
monthly rent.   
Excited that Flowers Baking Company was willing to renew the lease, Mr. Lindsey 
signed the Second Amendment and Renewal of Lease Agreement on February 10, 2011 without 
first seeking approval from the Bankruptcy Court.
304
  As previously discussed, 11 U.S.C. §
363(b)(1) requires a debtor to obtain court approval before renewing an existing lease.
305
However, in Mr. Lindsey’s haste to renew the lease he neglected to confer with either his counsel 
or the Bankruptcy Court.  Instead, Mr. Lindsey renewed the lease without providing notice to the 
other interested parties and without a hearing in the bankruptcy court.   
In an attempt to correct his mistake, Mr. Lindsey filed a motion requesting the 
Bankruptcy Court’s approval of the lease renewal on August 29, 2011.306  The Second
Amendment and Renewal of Lease renews the lease agreement entered into between the property 
owners, Mr. Lindsey and Mr. Caldwell, and the tenant, Flowers Baking Company of 
Morristown, Inc. on December 20, 1990 and renewed on October 1, 2001.
307
  The Second
Amendment and Renewal of Lease is for a term of ten years and commenced on February 1, 
304 Debtor’s Motion to Enter into Real Property Lease, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 
2010).
305 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2012).
306 Debtor’s Motion to Enter into Real Property Lease, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 
2010).
307 Id.
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2011 and ends on January 31, 2012.
308
  A hearing on the motion was set for September 22, 2011
at 10:00am.
309
On September 22, 2011, Judge Stair approved Mr. Lindsey’s request for approval of the 
lease renewal stating that no objections to the motion
310
 had been filed or announced.
311
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Order Approving Real Estate Property Lease, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5,
2010).
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CHAPTER 13: GRANT OF AUTHORITY TO MR. LINDSEY TO TRANSFER 
PROPERTY INTEREST TO RON NEASE 
On September 26, four days after Judge Stair approved Mr. Lindsey’s lease renewal with 
Flowers Baking Company of Morristown, Inc., Mr. Lindsey filed a motion requesting authority 
from the Court to perform all actions necessary to transfer his interest in a Cocke County, 
Tennessee property to Ron Nease.
312
  Interestingly, the Debtor’s First Amended Disclosure
Statement filed on February 21, 2011 stated that Mr. Lindsey was unaware that his name was on 
the title to this property prior to filing Chapter 11.
313
  The statement explained that the property
was purchased in July 2006 for $410,000.
314
  While Mr. Lindsey was unaware that he was on the
property’s title, he offered to obtain an appraisal of the property to see whether there was any 
equity in the property beyond $413,762.44 lien Mountain National Bank had on the property.
315
Following Mr. Lindsey’s brief and somewhat confusing statement regarding the property 
in February 2011, nothing was filed in the bankruptcy proceeding regarding this property until 
September 26, 2011 when this motion was filed by the Debtor.
316
  The motion explained that
Ron Nease had owned the property in Cocke County located on Briarthicket Road.
317
  Mr. Nease
needed funds to improve the property; however, he did not qualify for a loan.
318
  Instead of
borrowing the money for the improvements, Mr. Nease sold the property to Mr. Lindsey and his 
stepson, Scott Davis, in June 2006.
319
  Mr. Lindsey is a 50% owner in the property with Mr.
312 Debtor’s Motion Regarding Nease Cocke County Real Property Lease, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. April 5, 2010)
313 First Amended Disclosure Statement, In re Lindsey at 24, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Debtor’s Motion Regarding Nease Cocke County Real Property Lease, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. 
E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Id.
Davis.
320
  Mr. Lindsey and Mr. Davis then leased the property back to Mr. Nease.
321
  The lease
contained a repurchase option permitting Mr. Nease to repurchase the property for 
$410,000.00.
322
  As previously stated, Mountain National Bank had a lien on the property for
$413,762.44.
323
  In this motion, Mr. Lindsey requested authority from the Court to take all
necessary actions to transfer the property to Mr. Nease in exchange for the claim of Mountain 
National Bank secured in the property.
324
  Mr. Lindsey also requested that the time staying this
relief pursuant to Fed. R. Bank. P. 6004(h) be waived.
325
On September 27, 2011, Judge Stair granted Mr. Lindsey’s request to reduce the time for 
notice and hearing on the motion to approve performance of all acts needed to transfer his 
interest in the real property in Cocke County.
326
  Judge Stair shortened the time to allow for a
hearing on the motion on October 6, 2011. 
On October 6, 2011, a hearing was held on Mr. Lindsey’s motion to approve performance 
of all acts needed to transfer his interest in real property in Cocke County to Mr. Nease.  No 
objections to the motion were filed or announced, and Judge Stair granted Mr. Lindsey’s motion 
on October 6, 2011.
327
Despite Judge Stair’s order stating that no objections to the motion were filed or 
announced, Lincoln National Insurance Company filed a motion on October 6, 2011 requesting 
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 2.
325 Id.
326 Order Reducing Time for Notice and Hearing on the Debtor’s Motion Regarding Nease Cocke County Real
Property Lease, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
327 Order Approving Debtor’s Motion Regarding Cocke County Real Property Lease, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 
10-31694 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. April 5. (2010).
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53 
relief from the order.
328
  In support of its motion, Lincoln National stated that it had a pre-
petition secured claim in the amount of $900,000.00 secured by the Cocke County property.
329
Lincoln National argued that the hearing on this motion was scheduled for October 13, 2011, but 
was instead held on October 6, 2011 with no notice given as to the change in date.
330
  Because
Lincoln National was not given notice of the change in the hearing date and because it did not 
consent to the transfer of Mr. Lindsey’s property interest, Lincoln National argued that the order 
granting Lindsey’s motion must be voided.331
However, Lincoln National’s motion for relief addressed Judge Stair’s October 6, 2011 
order
332
 while also referring to Mr. Lindsey’s motion filed on September 30, 2011.333  Judge
Stair’s October 6, 2011 order granted Mr. Lindsey the authority to transfer his interest in the 
Cocke County property to Mr. Nease.  This order did not address the motion filed by Mr. 
Lindsey on September 30, 2011 regarding the lease with Venture Health on which Lincoln 
National had a lien.  It appears that Lincoln National and its counsel was confused when it saw 
Judge Stair’s October 6, 2011 order and assumed that it related to the motion filed by Mr. 
Lindsey on September 30, 2011 rather than the actual motion that was filed on September 26, 
2011.  A hearing on Lincoln’s motion was set for October 13, 2011.334  Prior to the October 13,
2011 hearing, however, Lincoln National withdrew its motion to reconsider on October 7, 
2011.
335
  While the documents did not state the reason for this withdraw, it is probable that
328 Motion for Relief from Order Approving Debtor’s Motion Regarding Cocke County Real Property Lease and
to Stay Order, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id. at 2.
332 Id.
333 Debtor’s Motion Regarding Cocke County Real Property Lease Associated with Mercy Health System, In re 
Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
334 Notice of Hearing, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
335 Notice of Withdraw, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
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Lincoln National and its counsel realized that the October 6, 2011 order did not involve the 
property on which it had a lien and that it had incorrectly filed the motion to withdraw. 
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CHAPTER 14: KNOXVILLE HMA HOLDINGS, LLC ASSET PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT 
Following Lindsey’s success requesting authority to perform all actions necessary to 
transfer his interest in the Cocke County property, Lindsey again filed a motion on September 
30, 2011 requesting authority from the bankruptcy court to perform all actions necessary 
requested by the successor Mercy Health Systems regarding Lindsey’s interest in an additional 
Cocke County property.
336
On April 5, 1989, Issus, Inc. and Cocke County Baptist Hospital entered into a 
subordinated ground lease under which Cocke County Baptist Hospital leased certain land to 
Issus, Inc.  The ground lease was for 0.581 acres located in Newport, Cocke County, Tennessee.  
Issus, Inc. agreed to pay Cocke County Baptist Hospital $10.00 as consideration for the lease and 
another $1.00 per year as annual rent for this Ground Lease.  Issus, Inc. then entered into an 
office lease agreement on April 5, 1989 where Issus, Inc. leased certain land and buildings 
located on the property back to Cocke County Baptist Hospital. 
William Lindsey is the sole shareholder of Issus, Inc.  On July 29, 1991, Issus, Inc. and 
Lindsey entered into an Assignment of Leases where Issus assigned its interest in the Ground 
Lease and the Office Lease to William Lindsey in consideration of $10.00.  Lindsey took this 
assignment subject to all loans and security relating to the Ground Lease including Issus, Inc. 
October 31, 1989 note payable to the order of Jefferson-Pilot Life Insurance Company for 
$1,875,000 which was secured by the property and a promissory note of Issus dated September 
19, 1989 payable to the order of Cocke County Baptist Hospital for $235,000. 
336 Debtor’s Motion Regarding Cocke County Real Property Lease Associated with Mercy Health System, In re 
Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010). 
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On February 5, 2009, Lindsey then entered into a Master Building Lease with Health 
Ventures, Inc. (Tenant).  Lindsey and Health Ventures, Inc. had entered into a prior lease 
agreement on April 5, 1989.  In the new Master Building Lease, Lindsey and Health Ventures 
terminated the prior lease agreement and entered this new Master Building Lease where Health 
Ventures, Inc. leased 36,540 square feet of space at 434 Fourth Street.  In the new lease dated 
February 5, 2009, Lindsey warranted that he had constructed a medical office building on the 
land and wanted to lease the premises to Health Ventures, Inc.  The annual base rent was 
$251,144.04 payable in monthly installments of $20,928,67.  The term of the lease was for 
twenty-three months commencing on February 1, 2009 and ending on December 31, 2010.  The 
lease also contained an automatic renewal clause where the lease could renew for up to two 
additional consecutive terms of three years each unless Health Ventures, Inc. gave Lindsey 60 
days notice of its intent not to renew the lease. 
Two and a half years after entering into this lease with Health Ventures, Inc., Lindsey 
received a letter dated August 31, 2011 from Elizabeth M. Stehler at Harter Secrest and Emery 
LLP.  The letter stated that Harter Secrest & Emery’s client, Knoxville HMA Holdings, LLC 
entered into an agreement to purchase substantially all of the assets of Mercy Health Systems 
and its affiliates located in East Tennessee.  Health Ventures, Inc. is an affiliate of Mercy Health 
Systems which had entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement with Knoxville HMA Holdings, 
LLC, a subsidiary of Health Management Associates, Inc.  The asset purchase agreement 
required that Health Ventures, Inc. assign all of its interest under the Building Lease to the buyer, 
Health Management Associates, Inc.  Health Management Associates, Inc. will then assume all 
of the rights and obligations under the lease.  The letter indicated that asset purchase agreement 
would be executed on October 1, 2011.  The letter also requested Lindsey to confirm certain 
57 
factual information regarding the lease agreement between Lindsey and Health Ventures, Inc. as 
well as consent to the assignment of the lease agreement to Knoxville HMA Holdings, LLC. 
However, because Lindsey had filed the bankruptcy petition, he did not have the 
authority to confirm the certain factual information regarding the lease or consent to the 
assignment of the lease without the consent of the bankruptcy court.  Lindsey filed this motion
337
on October 30, 2011 requesting the authority to perform all actions requested by the tenant and 
the purchaser relating to the Ground Lease and Office Lease at 434 Fourth Street in Cocke 
County, Tennessee.  Lincoln National Life Insurance holds a security interest in the Lindsey’s 
rights related to these leases.  However, Lincoln’s security interest would not be adversely 
affected by the assignment of the lease.  Lindsey and his counsel also asked the court to shorten 
the time staying this relief pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6004(h). 
On October 3, 2011, Judge Richard Stair granted Lindsey’s request to reduce time for 
notice and hearing on the motion regarding the assignment of Health Venture, Inc.’s lease.338
Judge Stair reduced the time and set the hearing date for October 13, 2011.  The hearing on this 
motion was held on October 13, 2011, and Judge Stair entered an order granting Lindsey’s 
motion on October 14, 2011.
339
  Judge Stair ordered that Lindsey may execute the documents
regarding his interest in real property in Cocke County associated with the Mercy Health System. 
337 Debtor’s Motion Regarding Cocke County Real Property Lease Associated with Mercy Health System, In re 
Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).  
338 Order Reducing Time for Notice and Hearing on the Debtor’s Motion Regarding His Interest In Cocke County 
Real Property Associated with the Mercy Health System, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 
5, 2010). 
339 Order Approving Debtor’s Motion Regarding Cocke County Real Property Lease Regarding the Mercy Health 
System, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010). 
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CHAPTER 15: WL & MC DEVELOPMENT, LLC REPLACEMENT LOAN 
DOCUMENTS 
On December 15, 2011, Mr. Lindsey filed a motion requesting authority from the 
bankruptcy court to execute replacement loan documents for SunTrust Bank’s benefit regarding 
SunTrust’s loans to WL & MC Development, LLC and the guarantees of the loans by Mr. 
Lindsey and Mr. Caldwell.
340
  The replacement loan documents would allow WL & MC
Development, LLC to rework its debt without any increase in Mr. Lindsey’s obligation to 
SunTrust bank. 
On September 5, 2006, SunTrust Bank extended a $1,050,000.00 development loan to 
WL & MC Development, LLC and extended a $4,412,000.00 line of credit for construction 
costs.
341
  Both the development and construction loans have become due and payable in full.
However, WL & MC Development, LLC requested that SunTrust Bank modify and extend both 
loans.
342
  The parties agreed to a discounted payoff of the loans in an amount of
$1,550,000.00.
343
  The total balance of the loans to date is $1,924,475.70, which includes the
accrued interest and late fees on both loans.  A hearing regarding this motion was set for January 
26, 2011.
344
On January 4, 2012, FirstBank filed an objection to Mr. Lindsey’s motion to execute 
these replacement documents to SunTrust Bank regarding WL & MC Development, LLC’s 
loans.  FirstBank filed this motion as a creditor and party-in-interest in the bankruptcy 
proceeding.  FirstBank objected to the replacement documents stating that execution of these 
340 Debtor’s Motion to Execute Replacement Loan Documents of Suntrust Bank Regarding WL & MC
Development, LLC, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
341 Id. 
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 Id.
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documents would allow Mr. Lindsey to continue to funnel money away from profitable entities 
and into WL & MC Development, LLC bypassing the bankruptcy estate and discriminating 
against unsecured creditors.
345
On January 26, 2011, the date the hearing on this motion was scheduled, Judge Richard 
Stair entered an order setting an evidentiary hearing on the motion and objection for March 7, 
2012.
346
345 Objection by FirstBank to Debtor’s Motion to Execute Replacement Loan Documents to SunTrust Bannk 
Regarding WL & MC Development, LLC, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010). 
346 Order, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010). 
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CHAPTER 16: CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE APPOINTED 
On December 22, 2011, Mr. Lindsey, the United States Trustee and FirstBank filed a 
joint motion to appoint a trustee to this bankruptcy proceeding.
347
  This motion was filed on the
heels of FirstBank’s motion to dismiss the case.  While the motion is relatively simple and does 
not provide for much detail, the parties state that all three parties agree that there was sufficient 
cause to appoint a Chapter 11 Trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C.  1104(a).
348
  While the motion does
not provide details of the “sufficient cause,” it is likely that the Debtor’s declining health, the 
Debtor’s violation of the Bankruptcy Code when he renewed the Flowers Baking Company lease 
without the court’s approval, and FirstBank’s argument that the Debtor continues to funnel 
money away from the bankruptcy estate to protect his family and business partners all played a 
significant role in the parties’ decisions to request a Chapter 11 trustee.  The motion also stated 
that FirstBank would withdraw its motion to dismiss if a Chapter 11 trustee was appointed.
349
Upon filing this joint motion to appoint a trustee, FirstBank filed a motion to withdraw its 
motion to dismiss on December 22, 2011.
350
  FirstBank requested that the trial scheduled for
January 12, 2012 on the motion to dismiss be removed from the docket and all pre-trial deadlines 
canceled.
351
A hearing was held on January 12, 2012 regarding appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee, 
and on the same day Judge Stair entered an order granting the request for appointment of a 
trustee in the proceeding.
352
  On January 17, 2010, the United States Trustee filed a motion
347 Joint Motion by FirstBank, the United States Trustee and the Debtor for Appointment of Trustee, In re Lindsey
at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
348 Id.
349 Id. at 3.
350 Withdrawal of Motion to Dismiss Case, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
351 Id.
352 Order for Appointment of Chapter 11 Trustee, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5,
2010).
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asking the court to approve the appointment of C. McRae Sharpe as the Chapter 11 trustee in this 
case.
353
  Judge Stair approved the appointment of Mr. Sharpe on January 18, 2012.
354
Following the appointment of Mr. Sharpe as the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Trustee, Mr. 
Sharpe filed a motion on March 22, 2012 requesting authority from the court to pay Mr. Lindsey 
a monthly allowance.
355
   Mr. Lindsey had requested $4,883.68 a month for his “core” monthly
allowances.  However, the motion requested payments of $3,500.00 per month for the Debtor’s 
living expenses.
356
  A list of these living expenses were set out in Exhibit “A” of the Debtor’s
January 2012 Operating Report
357
 and include such expenses as:
- $1,318.79 for medical/prescriptions,
- $1,123.49 for Home/Maintenance
- $685.17 for Utilities/Garbage
- $485.87 for Gas
- $720.15 for Groceries
- $219.93 for Dining
On April 12, 2012, Judge Stair entered an order granting Mr. Sharpe’s motion to pay the 
Debtor a monthly allowance of $3,500.
358
  Mr. Lindsey was required to provide the Trustee an
itemized reconciliation each month showing his use of the monthly allowance and all receipts 
and bills for the money used. 
353 Application for Order Approving Appointment of Trustee, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. 
April 5, 2010).  
354 Order Approving Selection of Trustee, In re Lindsey at 1, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).  
355 Miscellaneous Motion of C. McRae Sharpe, Trustee, for Authority to Pay Monthly Allowance to William Edwin 
Lindsey at 1, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. April 5, 2010). 
356 Id. at 2
357 Monthly Operating Report for Filing Period January 1 - 31, 2012 at 3, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
358 Order Granting Motion of C. McRae Sharpe, Trustee, for Authority to Pay Monthly Allowance to William
Edwin Lindsey, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
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CHAPTER 17: COMPENSATION OF PARTIES INVOLVED 
Mr. Lindsey retained Michael Fitzpatrick, of Jenkins and Jenkins, to handle his 
bankruptcy proceedings.
359
 Fitzpatrick was retained at $275 per hour, and had received $8,961 at
the time of filing, along with the $1,039 filing fee.
360
 Mr. Lindsey filed an application to employ
Fitzpatrick, and the application was approved May 14, 2010.
361
 Fitzpatrick has filed 4
applications for compensation since, as follows: 
Date Compensation Reimbursement of Expenses 
10/6/10
362
$14,451.25 $1,659.39 
2/9/11
363
$17,878.75 $1,168.98 
8/30/11
364
$28,155.75 $4,579.91 
12/29/11
365
$12,410 $23,396.97 
Based on these reports and the pre-petition fees, Mr. Lindsey has incurred $81,856.75 in 
attorney’s fees and other expenses of $31,844.00 ($113,701.00 total). 
Following the approval of Fitzpatrick as Debtor’s counsel, Fitzpatrick requested the court 
approve Tommy Daugherty (“Daugherty”) as a Certified Public Accountant.366  Daugherty has
requested compensation on four occasions, as follows: 
359 Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtor, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April
5, 2010).
360 Id.
361 Application to Employ, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010); Order, No. 10-31694 
(Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
362 First Application for Compensation, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010); Order for
Compensation, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
363 Second Application for Compensation, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010) ; Order
for Compensation, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
364 Third Application for Compensation, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010); Order for
Compensation, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
365 Fourth Application for Compensation, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010); Order
for Compensation, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010).
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Date Compensation Reimbursement of Expenses 
10/6/11
367
$1,875.00 $0 
2/9/11
368
$3,625.00 $0 
7/21/11
369
$7,812.50 $0 
12/29/11
370
$2,750.00 $0 
Accountant expenses have totaled $16,062.50. 
366 Application to Employ Certified Public Accountant, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 
2010); Order, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010). 
367 First Application for Compensation, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010); Order, 
In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010) 
368 Second Application for Compensation, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010); 
Order, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010)  
369 Third Application for Compensation, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010) 
370 Fourth Application for Compensation, In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010); Order, 
In re Lindsey, No. 10-31694 (Bankr. E. D. Tenn. April 5, 2010)  
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CHAPTER 18: FINAL OUTCOME 
While Mr. Lindsey’s bankruptcy proceeding is still far from over, there are a few predictions that 
can be made for how the case will be resolved.  First, with the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee earlier 
this year, the bankruptcy proceeding should continue at a quicker pace with less objections and fewer 
violations of the Bankruptcy Code by the Debtor.  Second, as has been happening throughout the 
proceeding, the Debtor’s non cash-flowing properties will continue to be sold off, leaving the Debtor to 
manage only the two cash-flowing properties.  Third, the court will agree to a sale of the Debtor’s 
remaining interests similar to a Chapter 7 liquidation.  Finally, we expect that FirstBank will probably 
receive less than $0.15 on the dollar before deducting litigation expenses (we’d wager this was a losing 
battle for FirstBank overall). 
